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Abstract—Provenance systems are used to capture history
metadata, applications include ownership attribution and de-
termining the quality of a particular data set. Provenance
systems are also used for debugging, process improvement,
understanding data proof of ownership, certification of validity,
etc. The provenance of data includes information about the
processes and source data that leads to the current represen-
tation. In this paper we study the security risks provenance
systems might be exposed to and recommend security solutions
to better protect the provenance information.
1. Introduction
In many application areas like e-Science, detailed informa-
tion about the origin of data is needed. This information
is crucial in deciding if the data can be trusted, how it
can be integrated into other sources, determining where
an error may have been made, and deciding how to give
credit to its originators when reusing it [1]. This kind of
information is known as provenance. Provenance, a kind
of metadata sometimes called “lineage” or “pedigree” has
been described in various terms depending on the domain. In
database system, the authors of [2] defined it as a description
of the origin of a piece of data and the process by which it
arrived in a database. W3C PROV’s specification [3] defines
provenance as the information about entities, activities, and
people involved in producing an artifact, which can be used
to form assessments about its quality, reliability, or trustwor-
thiness. In application to digital scientific data, provenance is
an important component in broadening, sharing, and reusing
scientific data [4]. Provenance is useful in validating results,
failure tracing, and reproducibility [5].
Provenance of a data product encompasses data acqui-
sition, compilation methods, conversions, transformations,
and analyses. There are two forms of navigating provenance:
moving backward to discover ancestor products or transfor-
mations, or moving forward to discover descendant products
or transformations [6].
Provenance information exists in many applications with
a diverse variety of tools available to keep track of it. This
paper concentrates on how to maintain provenance metadata
securely. Most provenance tools used do not provide security
guarantees that are needed to improve trust. We proposed
ways to provide integrity, confidentiality, and privacy assur-
ances in data provenance systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 gives background on provenance. The need for
security in provenance systems is briefly discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Finally, Section 4 presents our conclusion and future
work.
2. Background on Data Provenance
Different approaches have been implemented to support data
provenance in several domains. Many domain areas like aca-
demic/research organizations and business establishments
use provenance. The provenance information is limited to
the application domain, data representation model, or data
processing facility [7].
In scientific domains, the authors in [8] and [9], shows
how sharing data and metadata across organizations has
become the norm for strengthening the collaborative envi-
ronment. Provenance has been used to provide data quality
and attribution when using third-party data in the aca-
demic and research fields. Publications are a common form
of representing provenance for experimental data and re-
sults. They currently use uniform resource names like Han-
dles, persistent URL (PURL), and Digital Object Identifiers
(DOIs) [10], to cite the date used in experiments, enabling
other researchers to relate the data’s lineage to the actual
data used.
In the business domain, Simmhan et al. [8] showed how
large proportions of businesses deal with bad data especially
when data are collected from different parts of the business
and aggregated into the data warehouse. Data warehouse
provides an integrated view of the history of the data from
multiple sources. In this environment, provenance informa-
tion can be used to trace the data in the warehouse back to
the source from whence it was generated, as well as to trace
the source of errors, enabling adequate corrections [11].
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Provenance information can be used in digital foren-
sics which is the process of preserving, collecting, con-
firming, identifying, analyzing, recording, and presenting
crime scene information [12]. This provides an audit trail
to maintain the integrity of the information and give a strict
chain of custody for the data.
It is difficult to obtain provenance information in cloud
forensics, a method of applying digital forensics to a cloud
computing environment. Zawoad and Hasan in [12] dis-
cusses the challenges of providing provenance information
in a cloud, because of the black-box nature of clouds and
multi-tenant cloud models. They introduced the idea of
building proofs of past data possession in the context of
cloud storage to provide provenance for cloud forensics [12].
Zawoad et al. [13] proposed an open cloud forensics model
that includes support for reliable digital forensics in the
cloud.
According to [7], the other application domains that
may benefit from provenance are the interactive statisti-
cal environment, visualization, and Knowledge discovery
in databases (KDD). Given the wide range of application
domains that would benefit from provenance information, it
is necessary to study the existing provenance tools available.
3. Security Needs for Provenance Systems
Significant research in provenance focuses on recording,
managing, and using provenance information, but little work
has been devoted to security goals such as confidentiality,
integrity, availability and privacy [14].
Provenance metadata faces a number of security threats,
including active attacks from intruders. An intruder’s goal
might be to compromise the provenance data, which in some
cases might be more sensitive than the data itself [15]. For
example, in digital forensics, provenance information is used
in court, this information might be more sensitive than the
data. Digital data can easily be copied, erased or tampered
with, unlike physical documents. Even insiders might have
some financial or strategic reasons to violate privacy and
confidentiality by altering the history of the data [16]. Prove-
nance metadata becomes vulnerable to illegal alterations as
it passes through untrusted environments.
This brings about the need to provide a model for se-
curing the provenance; that is, “provenance of provenance”.
It is challenging to make provenance records trustworthy
because of the need to guarantee completeness [16]. Security
in a provenance system can be viewed as maintaining the
following services:
1) Integrity: Provenance that cannot be forged or al-
tered [16]; provenance can only be modified by
authorized parties [17].
2) Availability: Allowing auditors to easily verify the
integrity [16]; provenance should be available to
authorized users [17].
3) Confidentiality: Allowing only authorized parties to
read the provenance [16].
4) Efficiency: Provenance systems with low over-
heads [16], [17].
5) Authentication: Provenance is correctly identi-
fied [17].
6) Nonrepudiation: Neither sender not receiver can
deny the existence of the provenance [17].
7) Access control: Access to provenance is controlled
and limited [17].
3.1. Attack Threat and Risk
The taxonomy presented in Figure 1 classifies security in-
cidents. Each incident, composed of one or more attacks,
show how an attacker abuses the system to achieve an
objective. The attacker uses one or more tools to exploit
system vulnerabilities. Events show ways of exploiting the
vulnerabilities [19].
3.1.1. Threat Modeling. Threat modeling analyzes system
security from the intruder’s perspective [20]. Exploiting the
vulnerabilities of a system to create unauthorized results is
known as an attack [19]. Based on the security need of a
system, the four general classes of attacks [19], [17] can be
applied to a provenance system :
1) Interruption: Availability of provenance is dis-
rupted.
2) Fabrication: Insertion of bad/malicious provenance
data.
3) Interception: Unauthorized access to provenance.
4) Modification: Unauthorized tampering of prove-
nance.
The threats to provenance systems considered can be clas-
sified under two forms: internal threats and external threats:
1) Internal Threats:
Internal threats come from individuals with legiti-
mate access to the system. These threats are hard
to detect and mitigate because the attackers might
know what to look for to avoid detection. Insiders
can easily insert bad data and modify the existing
data to suit their needs [21].
2) External Threats:
External threats are usually performed by hack-
ers/cracker, saboteurs and thieves [21]. The most
common way of gaining access to the system is
password theft. [21] provides multiple ways an
intruder can gain access to an authorized account,
such as social engineering, exploiting system vul-
nerabilities, eavesdropping on the network traffic,
etc. Once an intruder gains access to the system,
they can attack/ misuse the information as they see
fit.
3.1.2. Risks. According to [21], possible risks applicable to
provenance systems include:
1) Unauthorized disclosure of information: This in-
cludes disclosure of confidential, sensitive or em-
barrassing information, which leads to loss of cred-
ibility or reputation.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of security incidents, adapted from [18].
2) Disruption of services: As a results of the threats,
resources might be unavailable when needed, caus-
ing loss of productivity.
3) Data tampering: In the case of digital forensics,
criminals or lawyers can tamper with the prove-
nance information to suit their needs.
3.2. Security Solutions
Suggested mitigation solutions against the threats are:
1) Cryptographic Digital Signatures: Cryptographic
digital signature is a cryptographic value calculated
from the data and a secret key only known by the
signer. It binds the signer to the digital data [22].
According to [22], digital signatures provide:
• Data authentication: Using cryptographic
signatures in provenance systems can ensure
data is created by the signer and no one else.
• Data integrity: Cryptographic signatures
make it possible to determine if the data has
been accessed or modified by an attacker.
• Non-repudiation: When bad provenance data
is found, the owner of the data can be veri-
fied/ identified.
2) Access Control: Access control is the process of
ensuring that authenticated users can access only
what they are authorized to [23]. Having appropri-
ate access control set up will prevent unauthorized
access to the provenance data. Access control can
be divided into two parts:
• Authentication: This is the process of iden-
tifying the identity of a user. The aim is to
verify if the user attempting to gain access
is allowed to do so [23]. Typically, one or
more of the following are used for access
control: knowledge (such as password) , to-
ken (such as a key), or biometrics (such as
fingerprint) [19].
• Authorization: This is the process of de-
termining the access level of an authorized
user [23].
Access control is insufficient to providing needed
protection on the provenance data when considering
internal threats [21].
3) Incorporating cryptocurrency primitives: A novel
method to secure provenance metadata, will be
to store provenance entries in a distributed ledger
system, like the Bitcoin blockchain. The blockchain
is a peer-to-peer distributed public ledger in which
every transaction is registered [24] making it easy
to track the ownership. It consists of a distributed,
chronological chain of blocks, with a linear path
from the first block to the current block. The
blockchain allows transactions, or other data, to be
securely stored and verified without a centralized
authority [24]. One benefit of the blockchain is that
data can be verified and time-stamped, creating an
audit trail.
The security of the blockchain is guaranteed by
maintaining a cryptographically signed chain of
secure hash values. Since this chain is stored at
multiple sites and is also being continuously up-
dated, it will be functionally impossible for this
chain to be manipulated by fraudsters. With this
ability, the blockchain can ensure the integrity and
security of provenance data.
In order to subvert such a system, an intruder would
have to gain control of all copies of the ledger and
also be able to forge signatures from all parties
providing the inputs. The technical details for this
model are beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced data provenance, the explicit
representation of the origin of data. We briefly discussed
the background on data provenance in e-science.
Using provenance as a basis for decision making largely
depends upon the trustworthiness of provenance [8], which
can be increased if the system that store and represent
provenance metadata provide security guarantees.
Given that provenance metadata face a number of secu-
rity threats, from outsiders and insiders, security guarantees
need to be provided by the systems that store the provenance
information. This will avoid data corruption or manipulation,
which will increase trust and data sharing, helping, for
example, reviewers, funding agencies, and scientists ensure
reproducibility of published scientific results. Leveraging
cryptocurrency primitives will ensure security, integrity, and
confidentiality of the provenance information, which will
be hard to subvert. As future work, we will present a
detailed security model for securing provenance metadata
using cryptocurrency primitives.
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